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ABSTRACT 
 
Recent developments in maintenance planning and 
management demonstrate that the establishment of optimized 
maintenance policies may drastically improve the 
performance and reduce the operating cost of facilities. 
However maintenance activities are typically outside of the 
core business of production facilities, hence enterprises often 
fail to catch the opportunities that may originate by properly 
optimized management strategies. A strategic maintenance 
management should hence encompass the possibility of 
outsourcing maintenance activities to ensure the necessary 
perfomance of production systems, while allowing 
enterprises to concentrate their resources on their core 
activities. In order to be effectively undertaken an 
outsourcing strategy must be supported by a proper 
performance oriented contract. The present paper aims to 
provide an adequate methodology to address such issues and 
to define a framework for the definition of the relevant 
contract variables such as availability levels, penalty 
policies, rewards and service cost. The methodology here 
proposed is based upon the evaluation of the expected profit 
function of both the outsourcer and the provider, by 
performing a trade-off analysis on the basis of the 
transaction costs. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Maintenance activities have recently gained a substantial 
interest due to the strategic management opportunities arisen 
in the market. Recent developments in maintenance planning 
and management demonstrate that the establishment of 
optimized maintenance policies may drastically improve the 
performance and reduce the operating cost of facilities. 
However maintenance activities are typically outside of the 
core business of production facilities, hence enterprises often 
fail to catch the opportunities that may originate by properly 
optimized management strategies. In such context market 
opportunities have arisen for enterprises that make of 
advanced maintenance management their core business, thus 
offering their services to companies willing to outsource. A 
strategic maintenance management may hence encompass 
the possibility of outsourcing maintenance activities to 
ensure the necessary availability of production systems, 
while allowing enterprises to concentrate their resources on 
their core activities, thus originating economic, financial and 
operative advantages. As a matter of fact, however, many 
enterprises are adverse to outsourcing strategies: this is 
frequently due to inadequate or unbalanced contracts.  
In order to be effectively undertaken an outsourcing strategy 
must be supported by a proper performance oriented 
contract. Although much interest has been focused upon the 
determination of optimal maintenance policies, not much 
attention has been focused to the importance of a proper 
establishment of contract variables such as performance 
level costs, penalties and incentives. While the problem of 
determining the optimal maintenance policy may be a major 
concern for service provider, the determination of optimal 
contracting conditions regards both the contractors and may 
be essential for a successful agreement. 
The present paper aims to provide an adequate methodology 
to address such issues. An overview of the different 
outsourcing contracts is hence preliminary provided, 
focusing upon the most significant contractual aspects. The 
analysis finally focuses upon Global Service (GS) contracts 
which are particular contracts which involve two 
contractors, an “outsourcer” and a “provider” in a 
performance oriented agreement. The maintenance service 
provider freely organizes and manages specific maintenance 
operations upon the outsourcer’s equipment in order to 
ensure the pre-established performance level. The 
establishment of such performance levels involves the 
definition of specific, Service Level Agreements (SLAs) 
which in turn involves the definition of suitable measurable 
indicators (Key Performance Indicators, KPI). SLAs 
typically have penalties associated with not meeting the 
specified performance levels, and sometimes have rewards 
when performance levels are outperformed. SLAs hence 
must be very carefully defined, and must be agreed between 
the outsourcer and the service provider at the contracting 
phase. Frequently, a Maintenance Information System must 
also be implemented to allow both the outsourcer and the 
provider to monitor and control the performance level 
achieved at each period, thus allowing the evaluation of 
penalties and rewards.  
According to the considerations reported above, it is clear 
that the contracting activity for a global service is a critical 
task that must be accurately performed. The contract 
variables in fact coordinate the relationship between the 
outsourcer and the provider whose individual profit 
functions are typically conflicting. The relationship between 
contractors must hence be properly coordinated in order to 
achieve a cooperation strategy to ensure a global optimal 
result. Such coordination strategy clearly depends upon the 
selection of appropriate contract variables.  
 In order to properly coordinate an outsourcing contract the 
individual profit functions of the contractors must be 
calculated and penalties, rewards and performance levels 
must be properly established in order to ensure the optimal 
overall performance of the system. To accomplish such 
objective the possibilities of establishing a win-win strategy 
between the contractors must be analyzed.  
In the present paper a coordination model is presented which 
involves the evaluation of the individual profit functions of 
both the contractors, taking into account fixed and variable 
maintenance costs (for the service provider), as well as 
system downtime costs (for the outsourcer). Such costs 
clearly depend upon the maintenance policy and the service 
level (system availability) established. Due to the stochastic 
nature of the relevant maintenance parameters the related 
risk must be properly distributed between the contractors, by 
means of suitable penalty and reward policies. Aim of the 
paper is to provide a framework for the definition of the 
relevant contract variables such as availability levels, penalty 
policies, rewards and service cost.  
 
MAINTENANCE POLICIES AND COSTS 
 
Maintenance is typically perceived as any activity carried 
out in order to repair any equipment that has failed, or to 
restore to its favorable operating condition when 
performance decreases due to the wear. Over the years, 
many maintenance strategies have been formulated to 
overcome the problem equipment breakdown. Some of the 
common maintenance strategies are given below. 
Corrective Maintenance 
Corrective maintenance consists of all the activities of 
repairing, restoration or replacement of components, 
required to re-establish the operating condition of equipment 
after a failure. This is one of the earliest maintenance 
program being implemented in the industry and still it is the 
only possible strategy when no information is given about 
the failure rate. This approach to maintenance is totally 
reactive since the maintenance intervent is triggered by the 
system fault. This strategy hence has no scheduled tasks and 
the corrective maintenance activity is required to correct a 
failure that has occurred. 
Preventive Maintenance 
This is a time-based maintenance strategy where on a 
predetermined periodic basis, equipment is taken off-line, 
some pre-established maintenance tasks are performed and 
the equipment is then put back on-line. Under this 
maintenance strategy, replacing, overhauling or 
remanufacturing an item is done at a fixed intervals 
regardless of its condition at the time. Each maintenance 
action may re-establish the state of the equipment “as well as 
new” thus resulting in a perfect maintenance action, or it 
may establish an imperfect state which means the machine is 
fixed to a condition that is worse than the new component. 
Complex maintenance models may establish a relation 
between the time required to perform the maintenance action 
and the availability level reached (Jaturronnatee et al 2006). 
Although this is a well-intended strategy, the process can be 
very expensive if the maintenance interval is too short or too 
long compared to the intrinsic failure characteristics of the 
machinery. The frequency and the duration of preventive 
maintenance tasks also influences the total availability of the 
system, hence the determination of a correct maintenance 
plan which optimizes system costs or system availability is 
crucial. 
Predictive Maintenance  
Predictive maintenance is a condition-based approach to 
maintenance. The approach is based on measuring of the 
equipment condition in order to forecast the occurrence of 
the next failure. Maintenance actions to avoid the occurrence 
of failures are then established and undertaken. Predictive 
technologies (i.e. vibration analysis, infrared thermographs, 
ultrasonic detection, etc.) are utilized to determine the 
condition of equipments, and to decide on any necessary 
repairs. Statistical forecasting techniques based upon 
equipment performance monitoring are also adopted to 
determine the maintenance tasks to be performed. This 
approach is more economically feasible strategy as labours, 
materials and production schedules are used much more 
efficiently. The main drawback however is that it is 
frequently difficult to find a reliable correlation between a 
measured parameter and the failure characteristic of the 
equipment.  
Proactive Maintenance 
Unlike the three type of maintenance strategies which have 
been discussed earlier, proactive maintenance can be 
considered as another new approach to maintenance 
strategy. Dissimilar to preventive maintenance that is based 
on time intervals or predictive maintenance that is based on 
condition monitoring, proactive maintenance concentrate on 
the monitoring and correction of root causes to equipment 
failures. The proactive maintenance strategy is also designed 
to extend the useful age of the equipment to reach the wear-
out stage by adaptation a high mastery level of operating 
precision. 
Maintenance costs 
The main concern when establishing a maintenance policy 
for a specified equipment is to achieve cost efficiency 
providing the adequate availability of the system. In recent 
years, there is a growing concern on the subject of higher 
maintenance cost and maintenance productivity. Typically, 
maintenance cost can be divided into two main groups. The 
first group referred as direct costs are easy to justify and to 
report. These direct costs consist of items such as labour, 
materials, services, etc. The other group of maintenance 
costs is hidden costs or indirect costs which are harder to 
measure. These hidden costs of maintenance involve for 
example breakdowns and unplanned plant shutdown, 
excessive set-up, changeovers and adjustments, idling and 
minor stoppages, running at reduced productivity, start-up 
losses, quality defects, etc. For each maintenance action 
performed on a generic equipment the Total Cost for 
Individual repair (TCI) can be calculated as:  
 
plmsp CCCCTCI +++=  
 
Where Csp = cost of the spare parts; Cm = cost of materials; 
Cl = cost of labour; Cp = cost of downtime (i.e. cost of lost 
production). 
 
In order to evaluate the individual cost of a generic 
maintenance action, the above listed cost elements should be 
evaluated. A complex system may undergo different failure 
 conditions (Failure Modes), each one requiring a specific 
corrective maintenance action. In order to evaluate the cost 
elements given before, hence, a preliminary Failure Mode 
and Effect Analysis (FMEA) should be performed. In 
addition some of the cost elements, such as the cost of spare 
parts, are fixed and strictly fault-dependent, while some 
others are time-dependent. In particular the cost of labour for 
a generic maintenance task can be expressed as a function of 
the Mean Time To Repair (MTTR): 
 
MTTRCC hl ⋅=  
 
Being MTTR the average time required to perform the 
maintenance activity and Ch =maintenance labour cost per 
hour. The cost of downtime, as lost production, can be 
simply (detailed evaluation of downtime cost is outside of 
the scope of the paper) evaluate as: 
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With p= marginal revenue and Tc= cycle time. 
 
The Expected annual cost of a generic maintenance policy 
can hence be calculated as: 
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Where MDT is Mean Expected Downtime incurred in 1 
year, and N is the total number of maintenance actions 
performed each year.  
 
COORDINATION AND GLOBAL SERVICE 
CONTRACTS 
 
A contract is defined as an agreement by which one or 
several economic agents commit themselves to one or 
several others to giving, doing or not doing something. The 
contract as an inter-individual coordination mechanism can 
be analyzed along two different approaches (Debande et al, 
1996). The agency theory approach (Jensen and Meckling 
1976) aims at solving the coordination problems between 
two contractors, a principal and an agent, within the 
framework of a bilateral relation when, on the one hand, the 
agent can choose the level of his commitment, and, on the 
other hand, his actions affecting the welfare of both parties 
cannot be observed by the principal actor. This literature 
(Guesnerie & Laffont, 1984a; 1984b, for instance) aims at 
defining optimal incentive contracts between economic 
agents holding unequal information. The transaction costs 
approach (Williamson, 1975; 1985) rests on the notion of the 
limited rationality of the agents. The transaction costs are the 
costs of coordinating the organization in its interactions with 
the outside environment and in its interactions between 
actors inside the organization. This analysis aims at 
explaining the organization structure, the control and 
management procedures which allow coordination of agent 
activities at the lowest cost. 
Outsourcing consists of two parties, the user company and 
the subcontractor, who have conflicting interests. Taking 
into account the interests of both parties, coordination is 
necessary. The reason is that by coordination the outsourcing 
supply chain can achieve the maximal profit possible. With a 
proper contract the total profit can be split between the user 
company and the subcontractor such that both parties are 
better off than when the outsourcing supply chain is not 
coordinated. In other words, with a coordinating contract 
both parties can ‘make a bigger pie’, and share it in such a 
way that each gets a bigger piece. 
A contract determines the legal parameters of the service and 
the responsibilities of each part and must pay attention to the 
combined value. The issue that is addressed in this paper is 
how to coordinate the contractors to achieve global system 
optimality. In order to achieve such condition the utility 
functions of each contractor must be taken into account. If 
the space of all possible contracts can be explored 
exhaustively, and the overall utility function for different 
possible contracts is linear, with a single optimum in the 
utility function for each agent, the system can be easily 
optimized. In such a context, the reasonable strategy is for 
each agent to start at its own ideal contract, and concede, 
through iterative proposal exchange, just enough to get the 
other part to accept the contract. When the utility functions 
are simple, it is feasible for one agent to infer enough about 
the opponent’s utility function through observation to make 
concessions likely to increase the opponent’s utility. Real-
world contracts, however, are generally much more 
complex, consisting of a large number of inter-dependent 
issues.  
A Global Service maintenance contract involves two 
contractors, an “outsourcer” and a “provider” in a 
performance oriented agreement. The outsourcer contracts 
with the service provider a defined scope of work, and the 
service provider charges the outsourcer a fee. In exchange 
for the fee, a service is provided at a guaranteed quality 
level. Global Service contracting for maintenance 
management involves the outsourcer to freely establish the 
most suitable maintenance strategy according to the failure 
characteristics of the equipment maintained. Such strategy 
may be heterogeneous, encompassing corrective, preventive, 
and condition based maintenance, as well as spare parts 
management.  
Global Service contracts hence rely upon the establishment 
of a certain performance level and a service fee. Typically 
the outsourcer establishes the desired performance level and 
the vendor establishes the corresponding fee. The definition 
of performance levels involves the specific, Service Level 
Agreements (SLAs) which in turn involve the establishment 
of suitable measurable indicators (Key Performance 
Indicators, KPI). SLAs typically have penalties associated 
with not meeting the specified performance levels, and 
sometimes have rewards when performance levels are 
outperformed. SLAs hence must be very carefully defined, 
and must be agreed between the outsourcer and the service 
provider at the contracting phase. Frequently, a maintenance 
information system must also be implemented to allow both 
the outsourcer and the provider to monitor and control the 
performance level achieved at each period, thus allowing the 
evaluation of penalties and rewards. In such case the 
investment should be properly shared. For such reasons, GS 
 contracting for maintenance outsourcing is generally 
troublesome, but it has a drastic influence upon the success 
of the contract. As a result of the contracting phase the 
following fundamental contract parameters must be 
established.  
Duration of the contract. 
The duration of the contract defines the amount of time 
contract is enforced. Depending upon the intrinsic failure 
characteristics of the equipment maintained the duration of 
the contract may be a critical issue for the vendor to 
establish the suitable maintenance policy since equipments 
degrade with age and/or usage. The contract must also 
define the terms and conditions at which both parties may 
prematurely solve the contract. 
Services, place of performance, initial inspection.  
Depending on the type of contract, the maintenance services 
are derived from the performance description. The details of 
the nature and scope of these services are based on the 
vendor’s work plans which can be modified and adapted 
from time to time at his own discretion to ensure that 
requirements are met. In general any substances used to 
clean and maintain the instruments, along with spare parts, 
exchanged parts and wearing parts only form part of the 
scope of the maintenance contract if they are explicitly 
included. In as far as possible and reasonable, reconditioned 
exchanged parts instead of new spare parts usually can be 
used at the vendor’s discretion. The ownership of exchanged 
parts is transferred to the vendor. Unless otherwise agreed in 
the maintenance contract the services will be performed at 
the location where the equipment is being used at the time 
the contract is concluded. If the location is changed by the 
outsourcer he shall inform the vendor of the transfer. If the 
vendor approves the transfer the maintenance services will 
be performed at the new location. For instruments that have 
not been maintained regularly by the vendor since they were 
first commissioned, or for which maintenance has been 
interrupted for more than one maintenance interval, the 
vendor may reserve the right to carry out an initial inspection 
at the outsourcer’s expense.  
Performance requirements.  
The performance requirements can involve several measures 
such as the upper limit on the number of failures over the 
lease period, the time interval between successive failures, 
the time to repair each failure and so on. When these are not 
met the vendor incurs penalties which must be explicitly 
stated in the contract. 
Not included services.  
The GS contract must also define the services that are 
outside of the agreement. Such services will only be 
performed by the vendor on the basis of a separate contract 
and at a separate charge. A typical issue in such case is the 
management of spare parts which may be charged to the 
outsourcer or to the vendor. Are in any case charged to the 
outsourcer the exchange parts which are necessary, not as a 
result of natural wear and tear, but as a result of external 
influences, such as improper use, operation or other 
interventions by third parties, as well as other circumstances 
that cannot be attributed to the vendor. Are also charged to 
the outsourcer all the exchange expenses of instrument-
specific consumables, unless this takes place within the 
context of maintenance without significant additional cost. 
Maintenance personnel.  
In GS contracts typically the outsourcer requires the 
maintenance tasks to be performed by trained and expert 
personnel. For such reason the vendor may be entitled to 
subcontract the maintenance work to third parties, however, 
such subcontracting shall not release the vendor from his 
contractual obligations towards the outsourcer. 
Maintenance times.  
Being GS a performance oriented contract it does not 
necessarily include time obligations for the vendor. The 
maintenance intervals are in fact derived from the 
performance, unless they are laid down in the contract. The 
time when the maintenance work will be performed shall be 
agreed upon by the parties. The vendor shall agree with the 
contractor the preferably maintenance periods. If the 
outsourcer suffers damage and he can prove that it is the 
result of a delayed performance, the outsourcer shall be 
entitled to demand compensation up to the price of the 
maintenance work that was not performed on time.  
Payment. 
As payment for the services, the vendor may be entitled to 
charge, depending on the type of agreement, a flat 
maintenance fee for each date or specific period of 
maintenance work. If the maintenance personnel are held up 
in the performance, the waiting times may also be charged to 
the outsourcer. The outsourcer shall also bear any additional 
costs incurred if, the maintenance work cannot be performed 
or cannot be performed in full within the agreed time for 
reasons attributable to him. The GS contract typically 
contains positive and negative incentives. A positive 
incentive is one involving rewards. If the contractor exceeds 
the minimum levels of performance, a monetary reward is 
paid. A negative incentive is a penalty imposed for failing to 
meet a contractual requirement. The type of negative 
incentive intended here is related to a specific performance 
requirement, such as availability. The presence of a negative 
incentive and a positive incentive will ensure that the 
performance requirements are met. However, the negative 
incentive provides no motivation for exceeding the 
requirement.  
Information/Cooperation duties. 
In order to allow the vendor to perform the required 
maintenance operations the outsourcers shall make the 
equipments available to the vendor’s maintenance personnel 
and representatives at the agreed time. The outsourcer shall 
make available for the duration of the maintenance work all 
the tools and the appropriate support staff to operate the 
instruments and support the maintenance personnel. The 
information required about the instrument to be maintained 
shall be passed on and the associated documents made 
available to the maintenance personnel and representatives. 
The outsourcer shall inform the maintenance personnel of 
any peculiarities and problems that have appeared in relation 
to the instrument to be maintained without being asked for 
such information. 
 
PERORMANCE MEASURES 
 
A key issue to achieve the optimum benefit from 
maintenance outsourcing is to track the performance level 
related to the maintenance policy established.  
For such reason effective performance measurements must 
be established and clearly agreed upon. Tracking the level of 
 service is a critical task to achieve effective maintenance 
outsourcing advantages. 
In the maintenance partnership scenario in fact, performance 
guarantees and continuous improvement goals provide 
greater control over maintenance results and assure 
production goals are being achieved.  
When maintenance is outsourced, the first question is how to 
measure performance. To determine the "best" measure, one 
must first determine the requirements of the system in 
question. Furthermore for plants running, on a 24 hour per 
day, 365 day per year basis, high availability is absolutely 
essential.  
Given that essential requirement, one of the measures for 
contractor maintenance should be derived from availability. 
The other should be based on economic considerations. 
According to the production objectives and the plant uptime 
required a suitable set of indicators (KPI, Key Performance 
Indicators) must be established in order to obtain an 
effective performance measure (Forni et al., 2003). 
Some of the most common performance indicators employed 
in maintenance outsourcing contracts are given below. 
Availability-related requirement.  
Even with adequate redundancy, system failures will 
eventually occur. The number of system failures will be 
determined by several factors such as reliability of all 
components and equipment, use of redundancy, 
effectiveness of maintenance, and so forth. When a failure 
does occur or when a preventive maintenance action is 
performed, the job of maintenance is to restore the system to 
full operation as quickly as possible. The downtime related 
to the maintenance task will reduce the overall availability of 
the system which turns into costs for the outsourcer.  
Availability related measures will hence be enforced. Such 
measures may be the maximum downtime, maximum time to 
restore system, and turn around time.  
Maximum downtime. 
Specifying the maximum downtime (MaxDT) is specifically 
intended to limit the periods of non-operation. A stated 
period of operation must be stipulated for a MaxDT 
requirement. For facilities, the requirement would normally 
be stated for each year of operation.  
Maximum time to restore system.  
Related to MaxDT is Mean Time to Restore (MTTRS). 
MTTRS relates to the maximum time it will take to restore 
the system from any one failure event. In other words, 
although the parameter MDT limits the downtime over a one 
year period, it is statistically possible for one failure event to 
take a long downtime to correct. Such a long downtime for 
the single action is usually unacceptable. MTTRS limits the 
downtime that results from any single system failure.  
Turn around time.  
Only a limited number of spares can be bought, especially at 
the equipment or "box" level. Consequently, when a failed 
piece of equipment must be removed and replaced at the 
facility level and repaired at a field or depot level, the length 
of time it takes to return the equipment to the spares supply 
is important. The shorter the turn around time (TAT), the 
fewer the number of spares that need be purchased, all other 
factors remaining constant. 
Economic requirement. 
Given fiscal realities and limited funding, economic 
considerations are also important. It is assumed that the 
contractor who can demonstrate in the proposal that they can 
provide the stipulated maintenance at the required level of 
performance at the lowest cost will be awarded the contract. 
"Cost" should be more than the price of the contract. The 
overall life cycle costs that will be incurred over the life of 
the contract should be considered. 
 
Notation 
L duration of the contract 
T preventive maintenance interval 
σ performance measure 
C(σ) maintenance cost incurred by the vendor 
I(σ) outsourcer’s revenue 
W(σ) vendor’s fee 
R(σ) reliability corresponding to performance level σ 
F(t) failure distribution function 
f(t) failure density function associated with F(t) 
MDT(T)   mean expected down-time 
MTTRf  mean time to repair of corrective maintenance tasks 
MTTRp mean time to repair of preventive maintenance tasks 
MTBR mean time between replacement 
Ch maintenance labour cost per hour 
hpp CMTTRC ⋅=  cost of preventive maintenance 
hff CMTTRC ⋅=  cost of corrective maintenance 
t transaction cost 
e performance monitoring cost 
Пo outsourcer’s profit 
Пv vendor’s profit 
p product marginal profit 
Tc cycle time 
Av (σ) availability of the system 
 
THE MODEL 
 
The need for coordination arises each time two or more 
subjects with conflicting objectives are involved in the same 
economic opportunity. Assuming a rational behaviour, each 
subject pursues his own maximum utility objective, thus 
preventing the system to achieve the maximum global utility. 
In other words, by properly coordinating the outsourcing 
contract, the system can achieve the maximal profit possible. 
Then, with a proper contract the total profit can be split 
between the outsourcer and the subcontractor such that both 
parties may benefit of the higher global profit.  
In order to achieve coordination a typical approach is to 
consider the “centralized” solution and the “decentralized” 
solution, analysing in the first case the global profit of the 
system, and in the second case the individual utilities of the 
contractors. The next step consists in modifying the 
contractors’ utility function in order to align their strategies 
and achieve the maximum system profit. Once this analysis 
has been performed, coordination may be achieved by 
establishing a suitable contract which modifies the 
individual utilities by adopting revenue-sharing procedures. 
To achieve coordination a contract must: 
(1) achieve a system-optimal level,  
(2) arbitrarily split the profit between the contractors. 
It obviously depends on the specific form of the contract, as 
it will be proven that the simple form of a fixed payment, 
will not induce the system to reach its optimal level.  
 In order to achieve coordination, a GS contract must be 
linked to a performance measure σ, and according to the 
performance level requested by the outsourcer the vendor 
should establish the corresponding reward W. Being L be 
the duration of the contract, C(σ) the maintenance cost 
incurred by the vendor, I(σ) the outsourcer’s revenue 
corresponding to the performance level σ, the vendor and the 
outsourcer’s profit functions are given by the following 
equation (1) and (2): 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) )1(σWetσIpσ,o −−−=∏  
( ) ( ) ( ) )2(, σσσ CWpv −=∏  
 
Let us also assume that t (transaction costs) and e 
(monitoring costs) are fixed, we will, therefore, drop our 
references to these variables (Bryson et al, 1999, 2000, 
2003). The model will be thus simplified as given in the 
figure below. 
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Figure 1: Basic coordination scheme 
 
A simple model for the outsourcer’s revenue function is to 
consider the outsourcer’s revenue related to the system 
availability Av. The application to a production plant which 
produces a product with marginal revenue p and cycle time 
Tc would thus be: 
 
p
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On the other hand the profit of the vendor is related to his 
reward corresponding to the performance level σ and the 
related maintenance cost C(σ). The cost for the vendor 
ultimately depends upon the maintenance policy adopted. 
The utility of the vendor increases as maintenance costs 
decrease, hence the establishment of an effective 
maintenance policy becomes a crucial issue in such 
contracts.  
 
GLOBAL SERVICE CONTRACTS WITH 
PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE POLICIES 
 
In order to give an explicit formulation of the above 
equations, an assumption must be made for the maintenance 
policy adopted by the vendor. In the present paper the 
maintenance policy considered is a standard preventive 
maintenance policy with perfect repairs as described above. 
In such case the availability (Av (σ)) of the system is related 
to the intrinsic fault probability function of the system and 
the average repair time necessary to perfectly replace the 
system condition “as good as new” when either a failure 
occurs (a corrective maintenance (CM) task is required) or a 
preventive maintenance (PM) is performed. The mean time 
to repair when a corrective or a preventive maintenance 
occurs are respectively: MTTRf  MTTRp. According to such 
considerations the expected revenue of the outsourcer as a 
function of the system availability (Rausand, and Høyland, 
2003) is: 
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The outsourcer profit, function of the system availability is: 
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Which ultimately is a function of the intrinsic failure rate of 
the system, the preventive maintenance interval and the 
mean time to repair for corrective and preventive 
maintenance.  
The vendor profit is related to the cost of the preventive 
maintenance policy, which again is a function of the intrinsic 
failure rate of the system, the preventive maintenance 
interval and the mean time to repair for corrective and 
preventive maintenance. The costs associated with failures 
of equipment are typically higher than costs associated to 
preventive maintenance. This implies that the optimal PM 
actions need to be determined through a proper trade-off 
between the CM and PM costs. For a preventive 
maintenance policy and a given interval T, the total cost of 
maintenance is: 
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Being Cp the intervention cost of preventive maintenance 
and Cf the intervention cost of the corrective maintenance, 
the vendor’s profit function is given by the following eq. (3):  
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Which is a function of the reward, the intrinsic failure rate of 
the system, the preventive maintenance interval and the cost 
of a corrective and a preventive maintenance action.  
In order to exploit the opportunities for coordination, the 
system profit must be determined.  
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Vendor-Outsourcer coordination is achieved when global 
system profit is maximized. It can be easily seen that a 
simple fixed fee contract does not allow achieving 
coordination. If in fact W(σ) is a constant, and both the 
vendor or the outsourcer pursue a strategy to maximize their 
own personal profit function, the outsourcer profit is 
maximized when the following condition occurs: 
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While the vendor profit is maximum when: 
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While the Outsourcer pursues a maximum availability 
objective, the vendor pursues a minimum cost objective. If 
in a fixed price contract the outsourcer pays a fee W for 
performing at level σ*, but the vendor actually performs at 
level σ < σ*, then in the absence of any penalty the vendor 
increases his profit by (C(σ)-C(σ*)). Even increasing the 
value of W (i.e. the outsourcers raises the vendor’s reward) 
will not have a positive effect upon the global system 
performance since it has no effect upon the optimal profit 
point of the vendor. Coordination hence cannot be achieved 
unless a proper revenue sharing contract is established which 
modifies the individual profit function of the vendor and the 
outsourcer. In order to achieve coordination hence a fixed 
fee contract cannot be employed, and proper 
incentive/penalty costs must be established as a function of 
the performance level achieved. A typical linear penalty may 
hence be in the following form: 
)()( * σσσ −−= akW  
Where k = constant fee, a = penalty rate, σ* = penalty 
threshold. 
In the contract considered if σ* = minimum availability 
allowed by the outsourcer: 
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And by assuming: 
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We achieve: 
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Thus the total profit is: 
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In such case the vendor profit becomes an affine function of 
the total profit, hence, by maximizing his profit, the vendor 
will maximize total system profit. The outsourcer profit 
share is given by k. Thus, by adopting a linear penalty 
function and by defining the penalty rate according to 
equation (4) system coordination is achieved and profit can 
be arbitrarily shared. 
 
NUMERICAL APPLICATION 
 
In this paragraph a numerical application is proposed. The 
system failure has been modelled as a Weibull function with 
α=1000 and β=3,5. The cost of the planned maintenance task 
is Cp = € 4000, the cost of the unplanned maintenance is Cf = 
€ 7000, L/Tc*p=100, MTTRf= 50 h MTTRp=20 h. The total 
maintenance cost per unit time is given in figure2 
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Figure 2: Vendor’s  total maintenance cost per unit time 
 
The T* that achieves minimum maintenance cost is approx. 
850 h with a total maintenance cost of 6,99 €/h. 
The vendor profit function is: 
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The system availability is: 
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The total revenue obtained by the outsourcer is: 
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Figure 3: Outsourcer’s total revenue per unit time 
 
The T* that achieves maximum availability is approx. 700 h 
with a maximum revenue of 95,99 €/h. With a fixed fee 
contract with W=50 €/h the profit functions obtained are 
given in figure 4: 
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Figura 4: Profit Functions 
 
The un-coordinated solution scheme is given in the 
following table 1, where solution 1 corresponds to maximum 
outsourcer’s profit, solution 2 corresponds to maximum 
vendor profit, and solution 3 corresponds to maximum 
global profit. With a linear penalty function contract, by 
defining: a = 100 and k = 50, and σ* = 0,9591 the 
outsourcer’s profit becomes constant, and consequently the 
total profit is an affine function of the vendor profit.  The 
maintenance interval that achieves maximum vendor’s profit 
will consequently ensure the achievement of total system 
profit also. The k parameter on the other hand will define the 
revenue sharing level. The coordinated solution given in 
table 2: 
 
 T* Av Total  Vendor  Outsourcer  
1 700 0,9599 88,78 45,99 42,79 
2 800 0,9591 88,90 45,83 43,01 
3 850 0,9583 88,89 45,96 42,92 
Table 1: Optimal profits per hour (€/h)- un-coordinated sol. 
 
 
T* Av Total  
(€/h) 
Vendor 
(€/h) 
Outsourcer 
(€/h) 
800 0,9591 88,90  42,91  45,99 
Table 2: Optimal profits per hour – coordinated sol 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
In the present paper the opportunities of coordination in a 
GS maintenance contract have been investigated. The 
methodology proposed is based on the calculation of the 
total expected maintenance cost and total expected revenue. 
The maintenance cost is incurred by the vendor, while the 
revenue is obtained by the outsourcer. The model consists in 
the calculation and comparison of the individual 
(decentralized) and the global (centralized) profit functions. 
The proposed model proves that coordination among the 
vendor and the outsourcer is possible in maintenance global 
service contracts provided that penalties and/or incentives 
related to a performance measure are consdiered. In the 
numerical application proposed the performance measure 
adopted is the system availability. The obtained results prove 
that establishment of proper contract parameters such as a 
linear penalty rate, fixed fee and performance penalty 
threshold allows the achievement of system coordination.  
 
REFERENCES 
 
Bryson N., Ngwenyama O., “Structuring IS Outsourcing contracts 
for Multual Gain: An Approch to Analyzing Performance 
Incentive Schemes”, Journ. of the Association for Information 
Systems, Vol. 1, Paper 9, 2000. 
Bryson N., Ngwenyama O., “Making the information systems 
outsourcing decision: A transaction cost approach to analyzing 
outsourcing decision problems”, Europ. Jour. of Oper. Res., 
1999. 
Bryson N., William E. S., “Designing effective incentive-oriented 
contracts for application service provider hosting of ERP 
systems”, Business Process Management Jour., Vol. 9, No 6, 
pp. 705-721, 2003. 
Debande O., Drumaux A., “Critical Analysis of Contractual 
regulation Mechanisms: An Organizational Approach”, Jour. 
of Socio-Economics, Vol. 25, No. 4, pp. 453-472, 1996. 
Forni C., Rossetti P., “Definizione e gestione dei KPIs in un 
contratto di Global Service”, Associazione Italiana di 
Manutenzione XX Congresso Nazionale Strumenti e Partners 
per una Manutenzione di Eccellenza, Bologna, 2003. 
Guesnerie R., Laffont J.-J., “A complete solution to a class of 
principal-agent problems with an application to control of the 
self-managed firm”, Journal of Public Economy, Vol. 25, pp. 
329 – 369, 1984. 
Jaturronnatee J, Murthy D.N.P., Boondiskulchok R., “Optimal 
preventive Maintenance of leased equipmento with corrective 
minimal repairs”, Eur. Journ. of Oper. Res., Vol. 174, pp. 201-
215, 2006. 
Jensen M. C., Meckling W. H., "Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure", Harvard 
University Press, Dec. 2000. 
Rausand M., Hoyland A. “System reliability theory: models, 
statistical methods, and applications”, (2nd ed.), Hoboken, NJ: 
Wiley-Interscience, 2003. 
Williamson O. E., “The Economics of Organization: The 
Transaction Cost Approach”, The American Journal of 
Sociology, Vol. 87, No. 3, pp. 548-577, 1981. 
